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the frequency and the likelihood of ultimate success of an action aimed at
surmounting statutory cost limitations.
Since its procedural advantages may be more than offset by its tendency
to undercut the traditional protection afforded to bona fide litigants, other
jurisdictions might hesitate to adopt the practice suggested by the New
York Court.
"ACCIDENT" v. "INJURY" IN WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION: A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE*
Wor=iEN'S Compensation Acts, by imposing absolute liability on em-
ployers, shift from injured workmen to industry the financial burden of
disabilities "arising out of and in the course of employment." I Many of
these acts require that claims be asserted within a period of limitations
running from the date of the "injury," - thus permitting recovery even
where no disability develops until long after the original mishap.3 But five
states, apparently desiring to give employers greater protection against stale
* Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co., 228 N.C. 447,46 S.E.2d 109 (1948).
1. Workmen's Compensation Acts are currently in force in all states except Mis-
sissippi. See, generally, SCHNEIDER, XoR MEN'S COM.PENsA'LTIO. STATuTES (3rd ed. 1939);
HoRovrrz, I-NjURY AND DEATH UNDER VormiEN's COwPEnSATio LAW.s (1944). While
statutes differ in particulars, most of them are patterned after the early BrTIsH Conr-,1;SA-
flON ACT OF 1897, 60 & 61 Vicr., c. 37 as changed by the AcT oF 1906, 6 EDw. 7, e. 53. See
1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENsATO1 N TExr § 9 (3rd ed. 1941).
2. 44 STAT., 1432 (1927), 33 U.S.C. 913 (1946); ARtz. CODE, c. 56, art. 9, § 56-967
(1939); ARK. Woram ComP. LAW § 18 (Pope, 1944 Supp.); CAL. LaboR CODE, Div. IV, c. 2,
§ 5405 (Deering, 1943); CoLo. STAT., c. 97, § 363 (1935); FLA. Sr.,T. AzuN., tit. 29, § 4-0.19
(1943); IowA CODE, c. 85, § 85.26 (1946); MIN. CODE, art. 101, § 51 (Flack, 1939); Mimn;.
STAT., c. 23A, § 4282 (Mason, 1927); Mo. Rsv. ST.,AT., c. 29, § 3727 (1947 Supp.); OHIO GE".
CODE, c. 28b, § 1465-72a (Page, 1937); OrMA. STAT., tit. 85, § 43 (1938); R.I. Gc.;. LAW
c. 300, art. III, § 17 (1938); S.D. CODE. c. 64, tit. 64.0611 (1939); TEN. CODE, c. 42, § 6Te9
(Williams, 1934); VT. STAT., c. 353, § 8110 (1947); WAsu. REv. STAT., tit. 50, c. 7, § 7616
(Remington, 1932); W. VA. CODE § 2540 (1943); Wis. STAT., c. 102, § 102.12 (1917).
In New Mexico, where the statute requires that claims be filed within a year of the
employer's refusal to pay compensation, N.M. ST.T., c. 57, art. 9, § 57-913 (1943), judicial
interpretation has made "injury" the operative event initiating the prescriptive period.
Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873 (1944).
3. E.g., Kropp v. Parker, S F. Supp. 290 (D. !d. 1934) (tumor developing fifteen
months after the original blow); Hartford A. & I. Co. v. Industrial Commision, 413 Ariz.
50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934) (cancer appearing two years after the accident); Acme Body WVorz:s v.
Koespel, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756 (1931) (cataract developing si years after thz ac-
cident).
But the word "injury" may not be an automatic talisman: two states ucing the term
deny recovery for latent injuries (see note 6 infra), while three states permit recovery despite
apparently more restrictive phrasing (see note 7 infra).
1949]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
or fraudulent claims,4 have joined a sizable minority by discarding the "in-
jury" limitation in favor of one running from the date of the "accident." I
While a layman might find little difference between these two provisions,'
legal semantics can transmute it into a difference of recovery or non-recov-
ery: where latent injuries do not appear until after the period from the date
of the "accident" has run, an employee's right of action is extinguished be-
fore it ever matures.7
The limited coverage provided by an "accident" type statute was recently
highlighted in the North Carolina case of Whitted v. Palmer-Bee Co., Plain-
4. See note 21 infra. Such protection seems to be the major purpose of a statute of
limitation on compensation claims. See Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300, 301,
270 Pac. 1103, 1104 (1928).
5. The statutes thus converted are: Conn. Public Acts 1927, c. 307, § S and ILL, STAT.,
c. 48, § 161 (as amended July 24, 1939, Laws 1939, p. 601, § 1, Smith-Hurd, 1939) (both
changing limitation from one year after date of injury to one year after date of accident);
IND. STAT., tit. 40, c. 12, § 40-1224 (Burns, 1947 Supp.) (two years from date of accident
rather than tvo years from date of injury). LA. GEN. STAT., § 4420 (Act, 1914, No. 20, § 31;
as amended by Act No. 29, § 1 of 1934, Dart, 1939) (now six months after accident where
injury obvious, and two years where injury latent instead of one year from injury; see p, 0000
infra). In Utah, where courts in workmen's compensation cases had previously applied a
general one year statute running from the date of compensable disability, Salt Lake City v.
Industrial Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P.2d 657 (1937), the Act was amended to require
that all claims be filed within three years of the accident. Utah Code Annotated, 42-1-92,
as amended by L. 39, c. 51 (1943).
In addition, the minority of twenty-one states includes: ALA. CODE, tit. 26, § 296
(1940); DEL. CODE, c. 175, § 22 (1935); GA. CODE § 114-305 (1937); IDAHO CODE, tit. 43,
c. 12, § 43-1202 (1932); KAN. GEN. STAT., c. 44, § 520a (1947 Supp.); KY. REV. STAT,
§ 342.185 (1948); ME. REv. STAT., c. 26, § 33 (1944); MONT. REV. CODES, c. 256, § 2899
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935); N.H. REv. LAWS, c. 216, § 16 (1941); N.J.S.A. § 34.15-51
(1937); N.Y. WORK. Comxp. LAW § 28 (McKinney, 1948 Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT., c. 97,
§ 97-24 (1943); ORE. LAWS § 102-1771 (e) (1940); PENNA. STAT., tit. 77, § 602 (Purdon,
1947 Supp.); S.C. Civ. CODE § 7035-27 (1942); VA. CODE, tit. 16, c. 76A, § 1887 (25) (1942).
But see notes 6 and 7 infra.
6. Nor do courts always find the distinction significant. Both North Dakota and
Michigan have "injury" statutes. N. D. REV. CODE, c. 65, § 65-0501 (1943) (claim must be
filed within year of injury); MIcH. STAT., tit. 17, § 17.165 (1947 Supp.) (claim must be filed
within six months of injury; claims for disability developing after this time but within two
years after date of injury must be filed within three months after they become apparent).
Yet their courts have equated "injury" with "accident," in effect placing these states in
the group listed note 5 supra. Bjorseth v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau,
62 N.D. 623, 244 N.W. 515 (1932); Hirsch v. Federal Steel Corp., 274 Mich. 406, 264 NW.
844 (1936). Unfortunately, the reverse process cannot be so easily accomplished unless
there is a statutory loophole like those cited note 7 infra.
7. This harsh result is avoided by three states which, though providing that the period
of limitations runs from the date of accident, permit an extension upon a showing of "mistake
of facts" or "other reasonable cause" for delay in filing a claim, MAss. LAW, c. 152, § 41,
§ 49 (1942), NEv. LAWS § 2716 (Hillyer, 1929), or "good cause" for the delay, Trx. CIv.
STAT., tit. 130, art. 8307, § 4a (V.A.C.S., 1948 Supp.). In effect, these provisions approxi-
mate the "injury" statutes despite their "accident" languages, and will be so treated in this
Note. Cf. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Frankum, 145 Tex. 658, 201 S.W. 2d 800 (1947).
8. 228 N.C. 447,46 S.E.2d 109 (1948).
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tiff had been struck in the eye by a metal chip, an accident regarded as
trivial by both the company doctors and the plaintiff himself. No compensa-
ble injury appeared until eighteen months later, when a cataract resulted.
Because no claim had been filed within the prescribed limitation of a year
after the "accident," the Supreme Court of North Carolina felt constrained
by the wording of the statute to deny compensation even though, in all other
respects, claimant had established a prima facie case.0
While depriving the plaintiff of a bona fide claim merely because his
injury did not manifest itself sooner seems contrary to the purpose of work-
men's compensation,' 0 it is difficult to see how courts saddled ith a strict
"accident" statute can avoid this result." A possible judicial device would
be to classify latent injuries as occupational diseases, since the period of
limitations for the latter usually starts to run only upon the appearance of
the disease. 2 Such a decision would be strongly supported by analogy, for
both are initially hidden and progressive in nature."3 But no complete
answer is afforded by this rationale. One fourth of the states exclude occu-
pational diseases from their compensation provisions,' 4 while others delimit
9. Id. at 448, 449, 46 S.E.2d at 109, 110. Under a strict "accident" limitation, to bar
recovery on this ground is customary. E.g., Central Locomotive & Car Works v. Industrial
Comm., 290 I1. 436, 125 N.E. 369 (1919) (blindness developing three years after the acci-
dent); Fiorella v. Clark, 298 Ky. 317, 184 S.W.2d 208 (1944) (spine injury developing two
years after the accident); Lewis v. Carnegie Ill. Steel Corp., 159 Pa. 226, 48 A.2d 120 (1946)
(cataract developing five years after the accident).
10. See Mr. Justice Pitney in New York Central R. Co. v. Wh1ite, 243 U.S. 183, 203,
204 (1917): "... there is more or less of a probability that the employee may lose his life
through some accidental injury arising out of the employment, leaving his widow or children
deprived of their natural support; or that he may sustain an injury not mortal but re-ulting
in his total or partial disablement. . . .The physical suffering must be borne by the em-
ployee alone. .. .But, besides, there is a loss of carning power . ..an expcnse of the
operation, as truly as the cost of repairing broken machinery. . . . It is not unreasonable for
the state .. . to require [the employer] to contribute a reasonable amount .. . irre-pac-
tive of the question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire lo2s .. .upon the injured
employee or his dependents."
11. See, e.g., Central Locomotive & Car Works v. Industrial Comm., 290 I1. 436, 439,
440, 125 N.E. 369, 370 (1919): "The legislature has seen fit to fix the time for making claims
for compensation at six months after the accident.. . .These provisions are within the
domain of legislative power and the court is without authority to modify them. If they
operate unjustly, the remedy is in the amendment of the law."
12. E.g., GEN RAL STATUrEs OF CoNN,., c. 280, § 5245 (Revision of 1930); Farmer v.
Bieber-Goodman Corp., 118 Conn. 299, 172 At. 95 (1934) (mercurial poisoning). Some-
times the prescriptive period begins only with total disability and incapacity to work. ERg.,
CAL. LABOR CODE, Div. IV, c. 2, § 5405 (Deering, 1943); Marsh v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission, 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933 (1933) (pneumoconiosis). See also Note, 86 A.L.R. 572
(1933).
13. While courts have rarely applied this reasoning, see Creamery Phg. Mfg. Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 226 Wis. 429, 434, 277 N.W. 117, 119 (1938) (blindness eventuating from
condition caused by injury is "akin or in the nature of a slowly developing disease which
ultimately caused blindness").
14. These include Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Newv
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coverage to a few specified maladies. 15 And even where the device is not
thus precluded, courts might still be chary of permitting recovery as if an
"injury" type statute were in effect.16
Since courts have found the "accident" type statutes too rigid for manipu-
lation, legislatures must adopt other varieties of limitation if recovery for
latent injuries is to be permitted. A few states, still leery of stale claims,
have compromised by enacting a hybrid statute which provides a period of
limitations running from the date of the accident but extending substan-
tially longer for latent than for immediately apparent injuries.1" While the
area of coverage is thus expanded, compensation is nevertheless denied
where meritorious claims develop after the period has run.18
The only statutes which insure recovery for all latent injuries are those
hinging the period of limitation on manifestation of the injury itself, and this
is the type adopted by most states. 19 But the recent defection of five mem-
bers of the majority 20 raises the question of whether such a provision unduly
exposes an employer to stale or fraudulent claims by permitting a period so
long that witnesses may have either scattered or forgotten details of the
accident. 21
If employers were required to prove the failure to comply with limitations
as an affirmative defense, the qualms of these states might be justified. But'
once the defense is asserted, courts invariably place on the employee the
burden of establishing the date of compensable injury.2 2 Moreover, most
states hold that the employee must assert and prove, as a condition precedent
to recovery, that limitation provisions do not bar his claim.23 In either case
he must show that, by exercising the care expected of a "reasonable man,"
he did not or could not have discovered the extent of his injuries prior to the
date he alleges. 24 Recovery is denied if the claimant's failure to file within
Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont. See 3 SCdNEIDER, NVORInuN's
COMPENSATION TEXT § 924-1040 (3rd ed. 1941).
15. E.g., Arizona, Arkansas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island. For a complete
synopsis of occupational disease statutes see SCHNEIDER, ibid.
16. See note 11 supra.
17. LA. GEN. STAT., supra note 5; MicE. STAT. ANN., supra note 6; N. Y. WORIC. CoM.
LAW, supra note 5.
18. E.g., Anderson v. Champagne, 8 So.2d 373 (La. App. 1942) (claimfor tumor develop.
ing four years after the accident held barred by the prescriptive period).
19. See notes 2 and 7 supra.
20. See note 5 supra.
21. The difficulty of rebutting a trumped-up claim may thus be enhanced. See I WOOD,
LIMITATioNs § 4 (1916); HoRovrz, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 248.
22. California, for instance, specifically makes the statute of limitations an affirmative
defense. CALIFORMA CODE § 5409 (Deering, 1947 Supp.). But once the employer raises the
defense, the burden shifts to the employee to prove that he made timely claim. New Amster-
dam Casualt Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of the State of California, 66 Cal. App, 86,
225 P. 459 (1924). See Note, 78 A.L.R. 1299 (1932).
23. E.g., Menna v. Mathewson, 48 R.I. 310, 312, 137 Atl. 907, 908 (1927). See Note,
78 A.L.R. 1294 (1932).
24. E.g., Wis. STAT., c. 102, § 102.12 (1947). Other jurisdictions have adopted this test
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the statutory period was caused by his own negligence or ignorance of his
rights.25 These requirements seem to protect the employer sufficiently
against stale or fraudulent claims.
The injury type statute, therefore, is sufficiently flexible to permit courts
to sort justifiable claims based on latent injuries from those delayed be-
cause the employee "slept on his rights." Admittedly, the danger of fraud
grows as the period of limitation lengthens, - But where a causal relation-
ship between accident, injury, and disability exists, recovery should not be
precluded merely because of delay for which the employee cannot be blamed.
States which have adopted the "accident" type statute would do well to
reconsider the question of whether it fulfills the basic principle of compensa-
tion for which it was designed.
judicially. E.g., Hickman v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., 238 Mo. App. 573, 185 S.W.2d 874
(1945); Clausen v. Minnesota Steel Co., 1S6 Minn. S0, 242 N.W., 397 (1932); Andern v.
Contract Trucking Co., 4S N.M. 138, 146 P.2d 873 (1944).
25. The generally accepted rule is that ". . . indifference or neglect or failure to ace~r-
tain one's legal rights does not constitute 'good cause' for failure to file a claim." Auburn v.
Liability Assurance Corp., 77 F.2d 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1935) (applying Texas statute). Al-
though an unconscious presumption in favor of the employee may operate on occasion,
courts finding that an allegedly latent injury v,-as apparent at the time of the accident have
not hesitated to bar the claim if filed after the limitation period beginning at that date has
expired. Sun Oil v. Barkley, 148 Okla. 208, 298 P. 280 (1931); Bruggeman v. Ford Motor
Co., 225 Minn. 427,30 N.V.2d 711 (1948).
26. See note 21 supra.
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